Science is a way of knowing. Because it is successful as a predictive accounting of the natural world it has enormous power. It is important for the public to have a reasonably accurate understanding of science as a discipline in order to maintain independent thought and understanding when science is discussed in the public arena. Most non-scientists are exposed to science through the media, through science writers or scientists themselves. Complex ideas are meant to be communicated in a way that the average person can understand. The media has largely failed in their attempts to do this. Is it possible to communicate complex ideas to the general public? How can this be done?
Science is a way of knowing but it is not the only way of knowing. The Latins distinguished between Scientia or knowledge and Sapientia or wisdom. Before that Aristotle divided Philosophy, 'the love of wisdom' into Theoria or metaphysical, pure knowledge and Proneia or practical, empirical knowledge. Before Aristotle, Socrates’ effort to find a wiser man than himself led him to question politicians, then artists and then craftsmen (techne). He expected them all to be able to explain their practical everyday practices (proneia) based on abstract principles or pure reason (theoria) but no one could do it. Of this lot the craftsmen were the best but claimed more than they knew, the artists were not as good because their testimony was neither repeatable nor consistent, and the politicians were the worst. This is unfortunate, because politicians attempt the most good for society based on the least theoria or proneia compared to an artist or an artisan. The difficulties surrounding what any one of us means when we talk about knowledge continue to the present day.
Anytime a substantive, sustained discussion on almost any topic proceeds, the participants will come to a place where differences of opinion will surface. If the discussion is to continue, the participants, in order to defend an opinion, will make an appeal to the “truth”, or to certain “facts” pertaining to the subject under discussion. At this point the discussion may end in a simple stalemate: “we believe different things about what truth is, or we differ about the veracity of the facts being presented.” If the discussion is to continue, then certain clarifications must be made. Where the discussion pertains to metaphysical matters, such as “is there a God?” or even “what qualities are we discussing when we are talking about God?” I will refer to such matters as big T or “Truth” statements. In this sense I am taking at face value the idea that some things exist, without making the necessary, albeit circular, epistemological arguments to support that there is a “thisness”, an “itness” or “quidditas” to mere existence. And where the discussion pertains to matters that exist within space and time, these four familiar dimensions of our (perhaps) limited apprehension, and which can be described with various amounts of precision through certain methodologies, depending on what particular type of events they are (historical, psychological, scientific, etc.) I will simply refer to these matters as small f “facts”.
My reason for this particular clarification between Truth and facts rests on a distinction between what is knowable and what is not knowable. And this distinction itself rests upon methodologies, the 21st century proneia of Aristotle. If there is Truth outside our four-dimensional apprehension by what method shall it be perceived? Any argument that posits theoretical physics or any other scientific scheme to counter this claim, for instance by theorizing about numbers of dimensions, or that nothing is not actually nothing, but is something, (as Lawrence Krauss has recently attempted to do) just prolongs the misery, since whatever may be within our ability to apprehend, or may eventually become apprehendable, there will always exist the possibility that there is still something outside of this new knowledge, whether it be 10 or 11 or 12 dimensions or some nothing that turns out not to be nothing. Attempts to arrive at knowledge about Truth by constructing a consistent logical argument regarding the divine attributes of God are vulnerable to claims that human logic is well, human, and therefore fallible. These lines of inquiry lead, inevitably, to quibbling over what divine attributes a particular argument favors as being Godlike. In any case such arguments may be persuasive for some, but are never persuasive for all and have no absolutely necessary application within the space of public reason. There is “no known method to proceed from the known to the unknown” (James Joyce) when the matter at hand is the theoria of Aristotle. While each individual may have their own experiential sense of Truth, or may choose to live within a traditional system of describing Truth or a Rawlsian “Comprehensive Doctrine” that seems reasonable to them, there is no method to examine the veracity of any claim to Truth.
Another way to appreciate the distinction between Truth and facts is to borrow from John Searle’s distinction between subjective and objective data. In the final lecture (Freedom of the Will) of his series 'Minds, Brains and Science', John Searle, Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, examines the evidence for and against the existence of free will. Searle notes that while the perception of each of the six billion people in the world that they have free will is subjective, their combined experience is an objective fact of biology. Claims about Truth belong to the subjective realm, their apprehension being primarily experiential on an individual level, even when reasoned arguments are used to discuss them. This is their proper domain. Facts reflect the combined experience of humans, are subject to objective methods of verification, and are suitable for the public domain. Because there is no sufficient method to examine veracity claims relating to Truth, we are left without a practical way forward when we enter any public domain that is predicated upon pluralistic, democratic ideals. Since there is no method by which Truth may be arrived at, Truth remains outside the domain of public space. It is enough for such Truth be examined in private spaces, and those private spaces should, in a pluralistic, democratic society, be fully protected.
John Rawls writes that “Public reasoning aims for public justification. We appeal to … ascertainable evidence and facts open to public view, in order to reach conclusions about what we think are the most reasonable political institutions and policies. Public justification is not simply valid reasoning, but argument addressed to others...” A public space is a space that is necessary to further the aims of a democracy. Such a space is needed in order to come to agreements about areas that concern all members of that democracy, for instance when there are differing views about where the junctures of private space and public space should meet up or intersect, or about the utilization of common resources. In such a space Truth may remain a matter of great personal importance for its participants. It may even motivate them to enter public space in the first place or to pursue certain aims within that space, but in a public space, there is no role for Truth to play. Public space is not a domain where Truth may serve to further the purposes for which public space exists in a democracy.
I understand it this way: each domain has its own language (where a language is a comprehensive doctrine). Each language makes sense to its adherents and is an effective tool of communication within its own domain. As a system of interlocking domains, society, in order to function as a whole, must sometimes come together around problems that concern society. In order to do this there must be a common language that is understood by all. This common language is the language of “Public Reason” that Rawls has attempted to construct, with clear syntax and grammar (rules and usages). Without a common language, society is like the mythical tribes and groups who came together to create the Tower of Babel, abandoning their project when they could no longer communicate effectively with each other.
What does further the purposes of public space? Michael Lynch offers us “practical reasons” as a method that can forward the aims of Public Space and Public Discourse. Lynch makes a practical argument for some standards of reason as common currency that ought to be “politically privileged”. These standards will include methods that are repeatable, adaptable and public. These three qualities are argued for because they hold a practical value in terms of efficacy. They work. Because of this they allow for maximum participation by all members and so fulfill the requirements of what it means to be a liberal democracy. This is not to argue for a fully consistent epistemic foundation. Rather it is to give practical reasons for adopting some standards over others while using reasons that can be recognized as reasons.
What makes these reasons practical? Why is it necessary that they have the quality of being repeatable, adaptable and public? For something to be practical, it must conform to the four dimensional world our senses are able to apprehend. This is the interface we find ourselves within, what I call “the really real world.” It is practical to use mathematics to fit a door to a door frame because this method works to effect the end that is desired. The door now fits the frame. It is more practical than an alternative method of ‘trial and error’ in that it saves time, energy and materials. In this way mathematics is a MORE practical method to fit a door to a door frame than the practical method of ‘trial and error’. Once we are familiar with various methodologies that effect an efficient interface with the four-dimensional world, we can discern that certain methods are superior to others, whether in terms of time savings, cost savings, resource use, accuracy, etc. Thus we may advance practical reasons to support certain positions, which can legitimately be countered by other practical reasons. It is the language of practical reasons that is necessary for communication to take place within public space. In this way comprehension is possible and compromise can sometimes be achieved.
There are certain types of interfaces with the four-dimensional world that are particularly useful because they have the quality of describing that world in a way that has accuracy. I will call these interfaces ‘facts’. These facts may be mathematical constructs, they may be biological or chemical descriptions and interactions, they may include geological observations that offer a consistency of description, etc. These facts are determined by methodologies that fall under the description of hard science. They are described thus because they have the advantages of being consistent, accurate and predictive. Our first historical record of the success of science began at 5:25 PM on May 28 in 585 BC at Miletus in Ionia. Thales, a natural (observer of nature) philosopher and astronomer, predicted a day earlier that an eclipse would occur at that time. Now, eclipses had been observed by mankind for millennia and had been occurring since the early days of the solar system, but this was the first time a 'scientist' had been able to predict one. Astronomers still use his method today. His effective prediction stopped a battle between the Medians and the Lydians, so from day one, the political consequences of science were felt! We can see the enormous power and relevance of this way of knowing in this story of the birth of science.
Another type of interface with the four-dimensional world has the quality of being highly accurate, but not to the level of accuracy that we can see in the hard sciences. These are referred to as the soft sciences. These interfaces are an attempt to bridge the gap between a mathematical accuracy in describing the world and the way humans intersect with that world. By applying similar methodologies to the human condition, whether it be the study of anthropology, psychology, evolutionary biology, economics, etc. we attempt to have a more accurate framework to understand ourselves within the world. This is an important distinction to make, because there is a significant difference between the predictive abilities of the soft sciences and the hard sciences. Just as the hard sciences began as descriptive attempts to understand the world, so too did the soft sciences. The soft sciences are making the attempt to go beyond description and to gain accuracy in making predictive claims. They have not yet achieved the accuracy desired, and they may never achieve 100% accuracy, but there can be practical reasons put forth, based on information acquired through the kinds of methodological practices that have increased accuracy in the hard sciences.
In the last few centuries the scientific method has been practiced with such great predictive ability that the proliferation of scientific disciplines has been accelerating at a high rate. Their number is currently doubling every 10 to 20 years as further specialization is required to accommodate the information being obtained. (E.O. Wilson) And yet, there appears to be a deep ambivalence or ignorance regarding science in America today. Even as we acknowledge that it is through science that America has largely achieved its current status in the world, there is a large subculture that is seeking to undermine or marginalize the practice of science. This is evidenced in the current debates that are played out in the media about the veracity of the theory of evolution as opposed to “creationism” or “intelligent design”. This cuts deeply into the problem of the role of public space and public discourse and how knowledge or facts are defined within that space. The decisions made within the public space about the education of children are what is at stake here. In a country that has long held the separation of church and state to be one of its core values, how have we come to a place where the private realm of Truth has invaded the public space of practical reasons?
One element that has dealt a fundamental blow to discourse of all kinds, but especially to public discourse, is a lack of concern for the precision of language. Because language is a system of symbols derived for communication between discrete minds, the whole system fails when there is a lack of clarity pertaining to the meaning of the symbols themselves. It does us absolutely no good if I ask you to close the door, and your understanding of the word “door” is what I would call a window, no matter how willing you might be to respond to my request. The task cannot be accomplished without further clarification. Comprehension will remain elusive if we do not have a shared set of symbols. And it may take quite a bit of work on our parts to figure out where the symbolic disconnect has taken place. Until we come to a mutual understanding that my door is your window and agree upon a shared symbol for this item, communication cannot move forward. These issues are thorny enough when we are dealing with a common language in a shared culture. Now consider that America is a union of many microcultures with populations of peoples from different cultures and languages and practices. Consider that language itself is constantly shifting in meaning and usage. Finally, consider that the language of science is a different kind of language from any of our spoken languages. Some have claimed that it is essentially the language of mathematics. Practically it is the language of a methodology, a practice. How then can this be a language put forward as proper to the public space?
It is at this point that we acknowledge the important role that translators have played throughout human history. The difficulties of translation across spoken languages are legion. Translations of non-spoken and extinct languages can be even more challenging, requiring the input of many other disciplines, such as archaeology, linguistics and anthropology, for maximum understanding. The difficulty of translating across domains, from the language of mathematics, through a methodology and then into a common vernacular, is very great indeed. The importance of capable translators cannot be overstated if we expect to move forward in this exponentially expanding frontier of science, which has proved to be the most accurate language to describe, predict and manipulate the four-dimensional world we inhabit. But who fills the role of translator and what qualities would it be necessary for them to show? How are they to be evaluated?
When translating across domains it may be necessary to have translators at different ontological levels. For instance, there is the symbol itself that must have a commonly understood meaning. Then there is the way those symbols are grouped, the way those groupings are combined, the way those combinations work together, etc., until we arrive at a consonant understanding of the whole language. As a loose analogy, in the discipline of science one could say that mathematics itself represents the symbols, the way those symbols are grouped (the syntax) are the application of mathematics to a methodology, and that the way those combinations of symbols (or grammar) works together is the methodology itself. Following this analogy, there is no way of translating the findings of science without an underlying understanding of the basic syntax and grammar, by which I mean the methodology itself. One would have to understand that the method is procedural, that findings must be verifiable and repeatable, and that the results are always fundamentally provisional.
In fact, science has become a language of its own. The claim that mathematics is the language of science is only partly true. A language is defined by a lexicon, a grammar, and a syntax. The Sanskrit grammarian Panini in 700 BC in his "Astaditi" (Eight Lessons) observed that each word in a language's lexicon can have three kinds of meanings: denotative, connotative, and symbolic. As a technical jargon becomes more and more specialized, the commonly used meanings of words depart so far from the denotative until the differences of degree become differences of kind. (Peter C. Patton) In this sense, science is not only a language, it is a live language, with many of te features of a live language; slang, shifts, variation etc. Translators must be adept at understanding context, audience, shifting patterns and areas of disagreement over meaning as they work to communicate scientific findings with the public.
Scientists themselves are able to share a common language, even across varying disciplines within the science community. Many scientists are able to translate their findings to the lay public in an effective way. But this is not always the case. Scientists are often fully occupied with the work they do, and the effort to communicate this work to a lay audience is difficult and time consuming. There are also scientists who irresponsibly misrepresent the discipline of science when they publish for the popular press, aiming at a lay audience, putting forward claims that are outside the domain of the scientific method. This is particularly problematic because it exacerbates the problem of the public and their trust of the ‘expert’ scientist. When scientists are able to effectively translate findings to the general public, it can be staggeringly successful, as in the cases of Carl Sagan, Bill Nye, and Neil Degrasse Tyson. But these are household names because they represent rare instances of the successful communication of complex ideas to the public.
Other participants in the communication of science to the public are journalists who specialize in writing about science. The task of writing for the popular media is challenging, not only because of the difficulty of transcribing complex concepts to a lay public, but also because media easily falls prey to the ‘Propaganda Model” that Herman and Chomsky describe in “Manufacturing Consent”. Given that American media is overwhelmingly in the hands of corporations which work under a market system and are dependent upon advertising revenue, the kind of writing that is published is largely aimed at the lowest common denominator in terms of readership. By this, I mean that a constellation of attributes, such as stickiness, shock value, the outrage factor, etc., will override considerations of clarity, veracity and significance. And science journalists are susceptible to the same kind of influence that politicians are subject to. Success in their field may be mediated by the corporations, universities and laboratories they are reporting on. The insidiousness of corporate and lobbying influence is notoriously hard to tease out. The scarcity of resources given to investigative journalism highlights the lack of will among the American media machine to inform the public. In this way, even without an overarching or singular agenda from the upper ranks of the media (although this may also exist), the population is at the mercy of a whimsical market propaganda, swaying the public’s concern in whatever direction the winds of the market happen to be blowing.
The public also needs to beware of buying into "science futures," which are widely sold by biologists and medical researchers among others, such as research into artificial intelligence (AI) and cognitive psychology. These “futures” come in the form of "We don't know today how x works or causes y but in 20 years or so we will surely understand this." The media greedily buys these "futures" and resells them to the gullible public. (Patton) One such popular future is Ray Kurzweil's "Singularity," i.e., "In 30 years the average desktop computer will have a much higher IQ than its user, store more data than the Library of Congress, and will spontaneously exhibit self-awareness." Caveat Emptor! Even the media is wary of this one, and rightly so. But this example serves to underscore the necessity for consumers of the media to be vigilant and wary of science claims, and to be equipped with the necessary tools to examine such claims.
There are also opposing philosophical claims to the efficacy of science as a way of knowing that must be answered. If science is qua sui a language, what is its intended universe of discourse? It can only be empirical reality. However, Richard Rorty in his book 'Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature' argues that science is not adequate to this task and fails to accurately mirror nature or describe nature. The physicist Anne Conway agrees, pointing out that the language of science sometimes fails. She notes that Newton's Laws cannot be as precise as claimed: The first law says that any object in the universe enjoys uniform motion unless acted upon by another, yet the three laws together assert that everything in the universe acts upon every other by the inverse distance squared law, hence the first law can never truly be observed. She agrees with Rorty that the intended precision of science as a language about reality is actually only approximate, however so much more accurate than that of the shaman that it works well enough for practical use. The point of both Rorty and Conway is we cannot really "know". I am not dissuaded by these arguments. My point is to privilege any method which can empirically show the most accurate interface with the four-dimensional world. If shamanism were that interface, then so be it. But this is not the case. If a scientist makes a claim that overreaches the empirical evidence, the process of science will eventually bear out the shortcomings of the claim. It is the process that is privileged, not any particular claim.
We currently find ourselves in the midst of a conundrum. The space of public reason has been overrun by members who wish to promote Truth claims rather than practical reasons in order to advance their agenda. Part of that agenda impacts the education of public school children. These members specifically wish to promote Truth claims as having equivalent or superior value to the claims of science as an interface with the “really real” four-dimensional world in the education of American children. They themselves have exhibited an insufficient grasp of, or complete disregard for, the language of science. In their zeal to promote their own private comprehensive doctrines they privilege Truth claims over practical reasons. It is as if, in order to cut off the possibility of communication that might challenge their own private doctrines, they refuse to allow children to learn and master the most important language of the 21st century. In this way, the future of our children is hamstrung, where limitations in education are externally imposed, preventing full freedom of intellectual development and utilization of resources.
One does not need superior imaginative abilities to discern some of the possible consequences if this state of affairs is not rectified. There is evidence that American children are already falling behind their peers in developed countries in the sciences and in technology. If this continues, there will be enormous economic, industrial and environmental consequences. The language of science is the most powerful interface between the human mind and the four-dimensional world. Without a commitment to the teaching of this language in our schools, and without the support of expert translators, whether they are scientists themselves or gifted science writers, we will find ourselves playing a role in a modern day version of the Tower of Babel. We will each be speaking different languages, without a common form of communication or a public space in which to practice public discourse.
There cannot be a robust public discourse without a reasonably educated public. Where public discourse includes the language of science in offering practical reasons for making choices about public resources and decisions regarding the maintenance of a civil democracy, the success of the public space is predicated on members having a reasonable fluency in that language. A stalemate in this arena will have clear consequences which will not be long in coming, given both the currently accelerating scientific interface with the physical world and the increasing use of the resources of that world by humans. Left unaddressed, problems of the environment will become blatantly obvious, with widespread impact. Countries that value the language of science will be better suited to adapt to the changes of an increasingly complex world. There will be economic consequences that will favor the countries that, having invested in mastering the language of science, are better able to navigate the problems of the future. The necessity of separating out Truth claims from practical reasons and facts in the public space has reached a critical point. If we do not privilege practical reasons and the language of science, and invest in an educated public that is fluent in the very language necessary to navigate the world, we will find ourselves unable to move forward.
Works Cited
Herman, E. S., & Chomsky, N. (2002). Manufacturing consent, the political economy of the mass media. (Updated Edition ed.). New York: Pantheon Books.
Joyce, James, (1922). Ulysses ‘Ithaca’. New York: Random House (1986 Ed.)
Lynch, Michael P., (2012). Democracy as a Space of Reasons, Truth and Democracy
Patton, Peter C., (2013). Private conversations and emails
Rawls, John, (1997) The Idea of Public Reason Revisited
Rorty, Richard, (1979) Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature
Searle, John, (1984) REITH LECTURES 1984: Minds, Brains and Science
Wilson, E.O., (2013) http://onpoint.wbur.org/2013/05/08/eo-wilson-letters-young-scientst
